In Lebanon, the Arab uprising is often analyzed through the lens of the side effects the Syrian uprising had on the country thanks to massive refugees influx and the involvement of Sunni and Shia Lebanese in Syria's battleground. In fact, popular mobilizations happened prior and during the current crisis as two different type of effects of the Arab uprisings at large. First, in late 2010 emerged an anti--sectarian movement that brought up an anti--system claim in line with other Arab social movements targeting authoritarian regimes and corruption. Second, the Sunni radical mobilization that started in Saida in 2011 around the popular Imam Sheikh Assir, gathered resentments toward the Shia leading party Hizbullah as involved alongside the Syrian regime and surprisingly adopting an active minority mobilization strategy. Both movement conducted demonstrations of different type (from classic march to on roads sit--in) starting from a completely opposite perspective and in a very different environment: when the anti--sectarian mobilization faded, the sectarian one rose. This paper will try to address the historical process of both mobilizations and assess their differences in light of several mobilization theories. It intends to raise questions about the type of actors involved, their discourses and justifications, and the contextual local and political environments.
countries have been recently published in edited books by French researchers like Allal and Pierret 4 or Bonnefoy and Catusse 5 . In Lebanon, the study of social movements through the prism of the civil society regained interest in the post--civil war era during the 1990s and reached a more theorised form by early 2000 with several milestones like Kingston 6 and Favier 7 and later on Karam 8 . But considering what did or did not happen in Lebanon regarding the uprising momentum, little has been said on local social movements who took the street or layed claims. And no clear links have been made between the context of the Syrian uprising and social mobilisations among sects except for security and political assessments 9 .
Lebanon is a country that remained at the margin of the Arab uprising process after the mass protests of 2005 that set the tone of a society mobilisation for its dignity and freedom but also for its fidelity to sectarian patrons 10 . However, the Syrian uprisings impacted deeply within the Lebanese political game because of the previous old and deep links that existed between the Lebanese ruling class and the Syrian regime, particularly in the post--civil war era. I have shown elsewhere how the two main political parties in the opposite coalition, Hizbullah and the Future Movement, imported the Syrian fault line between Sunnis and Alawites -largely built by the Syrian power to serve its mobilisation against "Islamist threat" -for their own political interest 11 . Within this context, I am going to investigate two Lebanese social movements which have lately appeared on the political scene: the Anti--Sectarian Movement (ASM) in the aftermath of the initial uprising in Tunisia and Egypt and the Movement initiated by Sheikh Ahmad al--'Asîr that took shape after the beginning of the Syrian uprising. They refer to two distinct segments of the Lebanese population - the secular vs the Sunnis militants - in two different locations -Beirut vs Saida -and at two different periods of time, respectively late 2010/early 2011 and late 2011/mid--2013.
The focus on these two mobilisations will not be done through the lens of "the civil society" concept firstly as it appears to be based on a western civil society conception that stays far from authoritarian regime contexts. I have rather chosen to rely on tools provided by the contemporary social movement theory, inspired by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly's perspective in Dynamics of Contention 12 , which proposes a relational perspective with a focus on interpersonal networks as well as an emphasis on a diachronic and contextualised analysis of mobilisation mechanisms. So my main goal will be to systematise the comparison between the anti--sectarian movement and the Sheikh al--'Asîr movement with corresponding tools of the abovementioned theoretical framework. In this perspective, one can identify three main directions for a comparative investigation: the context, the networks and the practices of contentious movements 13 .
The first intends to underscore the local context as a significant variable in order to provide precise descriptions of matrices of constraints and resources surrounding the two movements, including perceptions. The second will focus on social settings and informal networks in contention that encompass pre--existing social movement organisations. This does not mean believing in individual rationality -be it based on material or culturalistic factors -but instead staying focused on the social aspect of power. The third consists in investigating what people do when they protest, which means the study of the repertoire of collective action. This dimension clearly links the action to its context; the concept of repertoire also "assumes a universe of shared meaning, prior to mobilization" 14 , like symbols, stories, rituals, etc, all highlighting a self-definition of contentious actors as well as movements' identity regarding their vocabulary, behaviours, perceptions and actions/strategy within the political field.
In this paper, I will contend that despite their opposing postures on values and opposite sociological components, these two movements belong to the same momentum of the Arab uprising regarding its specific impact on the Lebanese socio--political environment.
In other words the two social movements under scrutiny can reveal in their functioning how the crisis, and the Syrian uprising in particular, created an environment that proved conducive for each of them at two different periods of time. This work is based on several fieldwork periods in Lebanon since early 2011, in collaboration with Giacomo Galeno for the research on the anti--sectarian movement. It is based on direct observation, interviews with militants, researchers, officials and other Lebanese actors in NGOs. It also relies on grey literature like flyers distributed during protests, sit--in or marches and other observations during meetings and outside meeting tents. Finally, I refer to newspapers and Internet references for political speeches and statements and other secondary sources like academic papers related to both movements.
Contexts of emergence and of opinion
When considering the emergence of the two movements, a striking difference appears regarding the context and how actors formulate their opinions within it. For ASM militants, the interviews conducted and more obviously their main slogan "al--shaab yourid isqat al--nizam al--ta'ifi" ("The people wants the fall of the confessional regime") which mimic the original "al--shaab yourid isqat al--nizam" ("The people wants the fall of the regime") already famous in Tunisia and Egypt show quite clearly the will to link and affiliate their mobilisation within the regional mobilisation against authoritarian powers. Moreover, it is rather clear that events in the Maghreb -the quick fall of Tunisia's Ben Ali regime followed by Egypt's Moubarak speeded up the formation and the mobilisation of the movement in Beirut. Its "anti--sectarian" brand stemmed from an older claim that has its own history in Lebanon. It referred to the civil marriage claim that started already in the 1950s as the Lebanese Constitution, in its article 95, made it compulsory for every Lebanese citizen to belong to one of the nineteen recognised sectarian communities; in other words, it is simply not possible to get married today in a civilian way only. With this Constitution article, the Lebanese Parliament acknowledged the power of sects on personal status and left its prerogatives on that matter to the religious authorities of each sectarian community., The debate commenced anew with the Taïf Agreement, in 1989, which put an end to the civil war and shaped the new Constitution of the Second Republic as it suggested to "de--communalise" the political system, a task Elias Hraoui, the first President of the Republic, tried to undertake in 1995 but failed to complete when sectarian patrons opposed to the creation of a civil status 15 . This is the perspective of the ASM main claim within the general claim of Arab uprisings targeting authoritarian regimes. Lebanese militants explain that contrary to other Arab countries, Lebanon has not one but several authoritarian leaders to fight, within each community. So, for ASM, one can follow Allal and Pierret 16 Both movements seemed to have internal agendas. The ASM one was focused on a regime change by implementing a secular Republic while al--'Asîr movement was devoted to the promotion of the Sunni community by denouncing the powerful Shi'i--led Hizbullah and supporting the fall of the Assad regime in Damascus. To do so, the two movements did not have the same constraints and assets to act on the political scene.
When it emerged, ASM was a civil society movement with no links to institutional politics because of its radical anti--system posture. In the meantime, the previous experience of some of its members alongside with the Laique Pride eased the formation of the core group around some radical ideas and ideals. The movement did not directly use the fact that the Taïf Agreements raised the question of the abolition of sectarianism in politics. But the debate was already well known within the society and ASM could rely on that to expect to gather a social dissent towards the Lebanese political actors.
For its part, al--'Asîr movement was in a weak position to start its mobilisation as Ahmad al--'Asîr was not a recognised cleric and was preaching in a small mosque located in a suburb of Saida. Moreover, his previous affiliation with Jamaa al--Tabligh, a quietist religious movement that openly avoided any statement that could lead to a conflict, was not really conducive to the gathering of radical partisans. In the meantime, among the opportunities that served al--'Asîr was the length of his investment in that Mosque and his strategic opportunism the moment the uprising started in Syria in sidelining with Hariri's Future Movement. His activism and his reputation as a Salafi figure spread during the Ramadan (summer 2011) and provided al--'Asîr with an audience. The economic situation of Saida as a pauperised city suffering from a lack of investment granted his movement with followers among the poor or disappointed Sunni fringe of that Sunni town. Hizbullah was then useful for al--'Asîr as it was progressively identified as the evil Shiite group that could be blamed for their disempowerment and for threatening the Sunni in the region and in Lebanon. The May 2008 events -during which Hizbullah took the street by force in West Beirut to constrain the Sunni leaders to pull back on a political decision -were reminded several times as a wound to Sunni honour that needed to be repaired. In sum, the internal context of emergence of the movement of Sheikh al--'Asîr reveals the importance of the conflict for the growth of its reputation, the necessity of identifying a local antagonist figure, Hizbullah, threatening the community to legitimise the struggle for the Sunni pride.
Networks for mobilisations
In the perspective of "looking for the weapon of the weak" 20 Manufacturing a sectarian reading of the situation Al--'Asîr was able to mobilise anger and dissatisfaction, blaming the pro--Syrian partisans identified with the Shia community. To illustrate this strategy of sectarianisation of the dissent toward the Shia, the religious dispute with Muhammad Yazbek, a top rank leader of the Party of God, is a good example as it also raised concern with Hizbullah itself 23 In sum, the networks for mobilisation are totally different as they rely on two distinct type of attitude toward the social environment. When ASM tried to politicized the sectarian issue at the core of the Lebanese political system, Sheikh al--'Asîr tried to do the exact opposite in sectarianising the political dissent with Hizbullah, using each opportunity to remind its constituency of the threat the Shia can be for the Sunnis. The ideological networks on which ASM built its mobilisation and its identity is thus in stark contrast with al--'Asîr sectarian mobilisation.
Repertoires, identities and the vocabulary of mobilisation
Investigating contentious practices can be made using Tilly's notion of "repertoire of collective action" as it allows the observer to look at detailed aspects of a protest, modes of action, constraints and resources of protesters in action, their cohesion and their self-definition. By providing an in--depth look at "how" mobilisations are organised, the conceptual category of "repertoire" offers means to reflect on the identity of political causes and on the vocabulary of motives people are using (elitist/populist, oppositional/radical).
As seen above, the ASM protesters decided to organise several marches and demonstrations in different locations in the main cities of Lebanon. They faced a lot of resistance among the State bureaucracy as no political forces were supporting them.
This meant that they faced the arbitrariness of the Ministry of Interior that is granting such permits and showed a strong will to be heard. This high motivation of the and therefore on the client--patron system, a corrupt and poor governance of public goods responsible for a lack of social justice. These demonstrations were also a great success regarding the diversity of people they brought together: Lebanese as well as Palestinians, women and men from various age categories and from different sects too.
Regarding the ideological orientation of those marches, one can note the presence of several civil society associations and advocacy NGOs as well as few leftist and secularist intellectuals, few religious personalities Christians as well as Muslims, and some leftist political parties.
Regarding its members, ASM can be described as a mainly elitist and radical movement.
When asked to comment on their experience during that spring of mobilisation, ASM activists expressed discomfort regarding what they felt as two main problems linked to the cohesion of the group. Firstly, there was a massive influx of new young members bringing pluralistic points of views, because of the social network call for meetings, owing to some of them. This led to the constitution of two options/visions for the future of ASM mobilisations: one could be described as the reformist line, calling for opportunistic alliances with several political parties, and the second option could be seen as the revolutionary line, with a radical position as it refused any kind of collaboration in order to avoid any sort of "recuperation" of the social movement giving popular legitimacy to any political party. Another problem that ASM faced was due to political interferences as SSNP and Amal tried to take control of the movement, sometimes using threat. Such problems aggravated the moment several members expressed their desire to show solidarity with the Syrian protesters. One can note that some members then chose to leave the ASM in such a troubled environment thus showing the limit of the political scope allowed by main political parties and its effect on the mobilisation when people opt--out.
The opportunistic attitude of the ruling class towards the ASM movement was twofold: either to use their claims in order to bring a new asset in the political debate (Joumblatt, Berri) or to try to integrate the movement in a political campaign (Hariri), all positions having a political agenda and none of them really wanting to consider the movement as a social force in itself. Several segments of this ASM group re--launched a new mobilisation for social justice that gathered 400 people on 27 February 2012, expecting to reawake the anti--sectarian movement one year after the initial gathering 26 But the difference is that here injustice is armed" 31 As seen above, the two movements differ by many aspects regarding the repertoire of mobilisation although they both used demonstrations and sits--in as a protest technique. showing the dependency and the adaptation of Sheikh al--'Asîr regarding local and regional events and constraining its movement to behave more radically following the violent development in Syria. By contrast, the ASM did not seem to depend on local events and tried to avoid mingling with the polarised topic of the Syrian uprising as it finally brought political parties at the forefront of the movement, undermining the struggle for the initial claims.
Conclusion
This paper presented a comparative reading of two social movements which emerged with the beginning of the Arab uprisings in late 2010. Following a SMT approach, I proposed a relational framework with a focus on interpersonal networks allowing a better understanding of the relationships between social movements and their political environment. This perspective was divided into three lines of approach. The first, referring to contexts of emergence of social movements, showed the important differences between the beginning of the uprising process with the high hopes and expectations of ASM protesters and an enthusiasm to believe in a historical opportunity for a political change compared to the anger and resentment motivating al--'Asîr militants within a context of turmoil in Syria and the breakdown of hopes after other difficulties faced by other societies in the Arab world.
The second line focused on the social context of networks and the power relations surrounding the two social movements. It is important to note here that both faced a common sectarian context but took diametric positions towards it, combating it (ASM) or playing the sectarian card even more firmly (al--'Asîr). Means to mobilise thus refer to a vision of the world, with ASM identifying the State as the main target for its radical project of change (secularisation) and al--'Asîr's movement identifying Hizbullah as the figure of the main threat. Their mobilisations were both rooted in previous experience and trajectories within the realm of politics they were already dealing with during the previous decade. For both of them, the use of social medias helped to recruit new militants but then the main difference appeared as the ASM worked as a democratic forum and al--'Asîr's mobilisation was gathering around the figure and the speeches/preaches of its Sheikh. envision politics through the analysis of their protest actions, speeches, slogans or behaviours, the repertoires. While the ASM finally dissolved its movement once the initial process of bringing the subject of secularisation of the state at the agenda of political actors of the system had been completed and spread its forces in several specific topics, al--'Asîr radicalised to the ultimate point of violence and ended in a brutal clash with the Army probably due to Hizbullah's intention to erase this movement as a dangerous catalyst of anger towards the Shi'a. While both were radicals, their repertoires of mobilisation revealed an opposite strategy of communication based on an elitist trend for ASM and a populist manner to deal with partisans for al--'Asîr. In sum, the two movements are depicting an evolution of the Lebanese society and its political system when facing popular uprisings in a distant vs close neighbourhood.
